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METRICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EARLY OPERATION OF THE 
WTO RTA TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM 
CHI CARMODY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization1 (“WTO 
Agreement”) is often said to be about “trade,” but this is only partly true.  
Nothing in the WTO Agreement obliges countries to perform specific amounts 
of trade.  Rather, the WTO Agreement is about the trade-related behavior of 
WTO member governments.2 
The foregoing statements are an indication of the WTO Agreement’s 
principle of “indirect effect” and the way in which the treaty’s legal system 
works at one remove to achieve its aims.3 They also emphasize a basic tension 
in the agreement between deductive reasoning based on an abstract model and 
inductive reasoning based on empiric observation.  The tension is manifested 
in evidentiary terms in the treaty’s use of presumptions and requirements of 
 
* Associate Professor & Canadian Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, 
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7.  Email: ccarmody@uwo.ca.  
The writer would like to thank the staff of the Saint Louis University Public Law Review for their 
invitation to present this paper on April 4, 2008, and Ryan Brown for his research assistance. 
 1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144–52 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], 
also available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf. The WTO 
Agreement includes a series of separately annexed agreements that provide specific treatment for 
certain items and types of disciplines.  Some, but not all, of these annexed agreements, were 
reproduced in the International Legal Materials (I.L.M.).  Subsequent references to the WTO 
Agreement or its annexed agreements will be cited to the Portable Document Format posted 
online by the World Trade Organization if not reproduced in I.L.M. 
 2. Id. art. II, ¶ 1. 
 3. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.78, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/DS152/R” under “Document symbol”) (“It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO 
legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect.”). 
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proof.  In many instances WTO law simply assumes a state of affairs; in 
others, it demands real evidence.4 
 
 4. For an example of perhaps the best-known presumption in WTO law, see Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, 
Annex 2, art. 3.8, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1228 [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf (DSU Art. 3.8 states that “[in] cases where there is an 
infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered 
prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.  This means that there is normally 
a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that 
covered agreement . . . .”).  For evidence-based requirements, see Appellate Body Report, 
Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162–164, 
WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official 
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and 
enter “WT/DS161/AB/R” under “Document symbol”).  The report states that “determination of 
whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable,’ may nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the 
contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a 
series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to 
the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or 
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation 
on imports or exports.” (emphasis added).  Id.  See also Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 
1A, art. 3.4, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf (stating 
that impact examination “shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices . 
. .”); id. art. 3.5 (causal relationship determination “shall be based on an examination of all 
relevant evidence before the authorities”); id. Annex II, ¶ 1 (determinations permissible on the 
basis of facts available); id. art. 5.3; id. art. 5.8; id. arts. 6.1, 6.6 (accuracy and adequacy of 
evidence, and opportunity to present); id. art. 10.7 (sufficiency of evidence); id. art. 11.2 
(evidence required for revocation); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, arts. 4.2, 11–12, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_ 
docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 
8.3, Annex I, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf; 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, art. 3.3, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf 
[hereinafter PSA], (scientific justification); id. art. 2.2 (evidentiary standards for price 
verifications); DSU art. 26.1 (detailed justification in support of non-violation claims).  Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 184, 
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) available at http://www.wto.org/ 
(follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple 
Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS26/AB/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report, 
United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 
7.153, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official 
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and 
enter “WT/DS184/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping 
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States,, ¶ 7.97, WT/DS132/R 
(Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under 
“Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS132/R” under 
“Document symbol”); Panel Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random 
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One subject of coverage in the WTO Agreement that demands evidence is 
regional trade agreements (RTAs).  RTAs are regarded as a means of achieving 
further multilateral integration but also pose the threat of trade diversion.  In 
other words, their potential to contribute to the broader aims of the global 
trading system is tempered by the ever-present “reality” that they may divert 
trade away from it.5 Consequently, the central provision of the WTO 
Agreement that deals with RTAs, Art. XXIV, demands proof of the magnitude 
of any such regional agreement as a means of assessing what the potential for 
trade diversion is.  Likewise, many of the unanswered questions in Art. XXIV 
jurisprudence can be seen as attempts to grapple with probative, and therefore 
essentially empiric, questions.  For instance, the requirement that upon the 
formation of a customs union, trade restrictions “shall not on the whole be 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties . . . prior to 
the formation of such union”6 or that countries contemplating such a union 
shall provide “compensatory adjustment” to their trading partners7 are 
essentially questions of measurement.  Whether or not the countries which 
have entered into an RTA have answered them are at the core of what disputes 
over the application of Art. XXIV are about. 
In recent years the number of these disputes has increased as the number of 
RTAs has grown.  By November 2007, 385 RTAs had been notified to the 
WTO, 197 of which were in force.  Of the agreements in force, 125 had been 
notified under GATT Art. XXIV, 22 under the Enabling Clause and 50 under 
 
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea, ¶ 6.43, 
WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/DS99/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report, Guatemala—Anti-Dumping 
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico,, ¶ 7.77, WT/DS60/R (June, 19, 1998), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS60/R” under “Document 
symbol”); Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, ¶ 332, SCM/162 (Oct. 27, 1993), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358, 488–89, available 
at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; 
then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “SCM/162” under “Document symbol”). 
 5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
at Art. XXIV, ¶ 4 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
gatt47_e.pdf (GATT refers to this dual concern in the following language: “[t]he contracting 
parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through 
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such 
agreements.  They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade 
of other contracting parties with such territories.”). 
 6. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 5(a)–(b). 
 7. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 6. 
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GATS Art. V.8  These numbers virtually guarantee that questions of proof—
and competing ones of presumption—will remain at the forefront of 
consideration of the role of RTAs in the WTO system in years to come.  The 
main issue is whether countries will continue to insist on proof concerning the 
questions referred to above, or whether they will be content to presume that 
RTAs are a necessary part of trade liberalization.  Arguably, the stalemate that 
has evolved over the approval of RTAs under GATT and the WTO Agreement 
can be taken to be a sign that while countries are de jure committed to 
measurement and metrifying the impact of RTAs, a de facto presumption 
exists in WTO law that RTAs are useful. 
The WTO’s much-vaunted dispute settlement system has only been able to 
cast some light on these questions.  Case law furnishes indications about the 
bare legal requirements for an RTA, yet decisions have not been able to 
resolve the issue whether individual RTAs comply with the WTO Agreement.  
Indeed, in Turkey—Textiles the panel maintained that “it is arguable” that 
panels do not have the jurisdiction to do so.9  What current experience points to 
then is a need for some means of assessing the compatibility of RTAs with the 
WTO Agreement. 
Provisional approval of an RTA Transparency Mechanism (TM) by the 
WTO membership on December 14, 2006, is a step in that direction and raises 
important questions as to why the TM is necessary, what specific functions it is 
designed to serve, and whether it moves the debate about proof-versus-
presumption forward.10 Briefly stated, the TM seeks to promote 
 
 8. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Draft Report (2007) of the Committee 
on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 4, WT/REG/W/51 (Nov. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/51” under “Document 
symbol”). 
 9. Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions On Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.53, 
WT/DS34/R, (May 31, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/DS34/R” under “Document symbol”).  The Appellate Body has likewise been reticent to do 
so, overturning panel decisions finding that an RTA conforms with provisions of Art. XXIV and 
therefore constitutes a defense to substantive violations of the WTO Agreement.  See Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, ¶ 198–199, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002), available 
at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; 
then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS202/AB/R” under “Document 
symbol”). 
 10. See generally WTO General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade 
Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 18 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Mechanism], available at 
http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then 
follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/L/671” under “Document symbol”). 
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transparency—that is “openness and understanding”11—about the operation of 
RTAs by building a database of information concerning them and thereby 
making comparison between them more straightforward.  The hope is that 
clearer information will eventually allow the development of benchmarks 
against which fulfillment of the requirements of Art. XXIV can be measured. 
It is too early to pass judgment on the TM’s success or failure.  However, 
the preliminary indications are not encouraging.  So far the Mechanism has 
experienced a number of “teething problems,”12 and WTO reports refer to 
“delays in the receipt of statistical data, data discrepancies in Members’ 
submissions, and delays in receipt of comments from the parties.”13 This 
record has undermined one of the most notable attributes of the new 
Mechanism, speed, and required the consideration of several RTAs to be 
postponed.  While not stated openly, an unspoken fear seems to be growing 
that the TM may become an ineffectual appendage of the WTO system, 
essentially replicating experience with the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM).14 
A reading of the minutes of the WTO Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA) also suggests that a careful dance is taking place as 
countries become accustomed to the TM provisions and warily reveal 
information about the RTAs they have entered into.  TM paragraph ten 
provides that nothing in the Secretariat’s collection of information—known as 
a ‘factual presentation’—“shall be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
procedures or to create new rights and obligations for [WTO] Members.” 15  
However, the behavior of countries betrays a different attitude, one of 
watchfulness and apprehension.  No country appears willing to “bare it all” or, 
 
 11. Samuli Seppänen, Good Governance in International Law, ERIK CASTRÉN INSTITUTE 
RESEARCH REPORTS, Erik Castrén Institute of Int’l Law and Human Rights at the Univ. of 
Helsinki 102 (2003) (Fin.). 
 12. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14–15 May 
2007, ¶ 8, WT/REG/M/46 (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official 
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and 
enter “WT/REG/M/46” under “Document symbol”). 
 13. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Draft Report (2007) of the Committee 
on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 16, WT/REG/W/51 (Nov. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/51” under “Document 
symbol”). 
 14. See generally Petros C. Mavroidis, Surveillance Schemes: The GATT’s New Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 374 (1992); but see Julien Chaisse & Debashis 
Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 
(2007) (finding a relationship between issues raised in Trade Policy Reviews and subsequent 
legal challenges launched in WTO dispute settlement). 
 15. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 10. 
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at any rate, to acknowledge the conclusions that information gathered under 
the TM might suggest—at least not yet.16 
This article is therefore focused on what the TM is, what early experience 
with it has been, and what functions it could serve in future.  Current 
developments infer that there will soon come a time when a need to use the 
information being gathered by the TM will arise, and this, in turn, raises the 
question of how customs unions and free trade agreements are to be analyzed.  
Methodologies will have to be developed.  At the same time, a purely 
quantitative approach to the task seems to be at odds with the evolving 
understanding of Art. XXIV.  New methods of analysis, possibly inspired by 
techniques of regulatory impact assessment (RIA),17 may be more appropriate. 
This article is divided into four parts.  Following the Introduction, Part II 
deals with the RTA Transparency Mechanism and its requirements.  Part III 
provides a summary of experience with the TM to date.  Part IV examines the 
development of alternatives to quantification by examining the experience of 
regulatory impact assessment in Canada and other countries.  This experience 
may be relevant to operation of the TM in future.  Finally, Part V offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II.  THE WTO RTA TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM 
The WTO TM is designed to enhance the transparency of information 
concerning RTAs.  Contrary to what might be expected, however, the TM is 
not the first attempt to promote transparency in GATT or the WTO Agreement 
concerning RTAs.  A 1996 Note by the WTO Secretariat observed that in early 
GATT practice, parties to RTAs notified under Art. XXIV furnished specific 
information requested by GATT working parties, but apparently little more.18  
 
 16. In this respect, even a major WTO participant like the United States has expressed the 
view that it “did not really see the basis for analytical work being pursued in the context of a 
database[,]” Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 24, put together under the 
auspices of the TM and that WTO Secretariat officials have taken pains to assure the membership 
that they “would be very careful to make sure that none of the information that was on the 
database would compromise the position of Members vis-à-vis each other.”  Id. ¶ 26. 
 17. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], Trade Directorate, 
Trade Committee, Regulatory Reform and Market Openness: Processes to Assess Effectively the 
Trade and Investment Impact of Regulation, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 48, at 11, 
OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(2006)40/FINAL (Feb. 9, 2007) (prepared by David Shortall) 
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform and Market Openness], available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/ 
olis/2006doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00007782/$FILE/JT03221506.PDF (defining RIA as “an analytical 
and systematic approach to regulation encompassing a range of tools and techniques aimed at 
assessing the impacts of regulation”). 
 18. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, Checklist of 
Points on Reporting on the Operation of Regional Agreements, WT/REG/W/3 (June 20, 1996) 
[hereinafter Checklist of Points], available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
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The Note goes on to observe that this ad hoc approach led to a lack of 
consistency in the reporting procedure, something which prompted the GATT 
Contracting Parties to adopt a Decision in 1971 establishing a calendar of fixed 
dates for the biennial examination of existing RTAs.19  The 1971 Decision 
failed to eliminate all of the shortcomings concerning this issue: 
  Biennial reports on regional agreements in accordance with the 1971 
Decision were regularly received until 1986.  From the early 1980s, however, 
there was very little discussion of the reports in the meetings of the GATT 
Council of Representatives, and as of 1987, no reports have been received on 
agreements notified under Article XXIV.20 
In 1994, a further attempt at transparency was introduced in the form of the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, which was agreed to as 
part of the WTO Agreement.21  Nevertheless, the wording of the 
Understanding is only slightly more formal and precise than what existed 
previously and in practice did little to solve Art. XXIV’s problems. 
The TM is the latest attempt to deal with these problems.  It has five 
principal features: early announcement of RTA negotiations; notification of 
concluded RTAs; consideration of RTAs through the WTO Secretariat’s 
preparation of a “factual presentation” on each RTA; subsequent notification 
and reporting; and recordkeeping. 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the new RTA TM is its stated emphasis 
on transparency, a value that lies at the core of contemporary governance 
 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/REG/W/3” under “Document symbol”). 
 19. Id. ¶ 2 (citing GATT B.I.S.D. (18th  Supp.) at 38 (1971)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, ¶ 7, 33 I.L.M. 1161, 1162 
[hereinafter Understanding on Interpretation of Article XXIV], also available at http://www.wto. 
org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf. The Understanding on Interpretation of Article 
XXIV states that “notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Art. XXIV shall be examined by a 
working party . . .” which “shall submit a report to the [WTO] Council for Trade in Goods on its 
findings.”  Id.  The Council is then left to “make such recommendations to Members as it deems 
appropriate.”  Id.  These may include recommendations in respect of interim agreements on the 
proposed time-frame for phase-in of the RTA and “on measures required to complete the 
formation of the customs union or free-trade area.”  Id. ¶ 8.  It also requires notification of 
“substantial changes” in the plan, id. ¶ 9, and schedule of interim RTAs and observes that “parties 
shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such [interim] agreement if they are not 
prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.”  Id. ¶ 10.  It also requires that 
with respect to completed RTAs “[a]ny significant changes and/or developments in the 
agreements should be reported as they occur.” Id. ¶ 11.  See also WTO, The Technical 
Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements, WT/TC/NOTIF/REG/1 (Sept. 9, 1996), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/TC/NOTIF/ REG/1” under 
“Document symbol”). 
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theory.  In an age of accountability, transparency has come to be regarded as a 
chief attribute of good governance.  Definitions of good governance confirm 
the point.  They can be found in the work of the World Bank, which is the 
originating source of good governance theory,22 as well as in the European 
Commission, which has determined that the principles of good governance can 
be summarized as values of openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence.  The former United Nations Human Rights 
Commission (now the United Nations Human Rights Council) likewise has 
identified five attributes of good governance: transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, participation and responsiveness. 
In each definition above what becomes abundantly clear is that 
transparency is the first virtue of good governance.  Thought about carefully, it 
is not hard to imagine why.  Transparency involves the dissemination of 
information so that appraisal and decision-making can occur.  Without it, other 
governance values will not be realized.  Transparency is therefore a pre-
condition or requirement for virtually all other aspects of good governance. 
The law of a number of domestic and international organizations 
recognizes this necessity and attempts to promote it.  In the European Union, 
for instance, the first article of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that 
the “[t]reaty marks a new state of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible.”23  
Pursuant to TEU Art. 255, the European Parliament and the Council have 
adopted regulations on public access to Council and Commission documents,24 
and the European Court of Justice has dealt with a number of cases alleging 
violation of transparency requirements in the EU context.25  Nevertheless, 
commentators have observed that the European Court has not elevated 
transparency to the status of  “a general principle of EC law.”26 
 
 22. Seppänen, supra note 11, at 8. 
 23. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, tit. I, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 10 (emphasis added), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:325:0001:0184: 
EN:PDF. 
 24. Council Regulation 1049/2001, Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43, 43–48, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:145:0043:0048:EN:PDF. See also 
Steve Peers, The New Regulation on Access to Documents: A Critical Analysis, 21 YEARBOOK OF 
EUROPEAN LAW 385, 385 (2002). 
 25. See, e.g., Case T-174/95, Journalistförbundet v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2289, 2312 
(ECJ case law on transparency); Case T-105/95, WWF UK v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-313, 
343; Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 
1651, 1687; Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. II-2489, 2505; Case C-353/99 P, 
Council v. Hautala, 2001 E.C.R I-9565, 9573. 
 26. Seppänen, supra note 11, at 43 (citing PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: 
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 393 (3d ed. 2003)). 
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In context of the WTO Agreement, transparency refers to the openness of 
each WTO member, and more specifically, to making sure that information 
provided by each member is “evident and discernible” to the rest of the WTO 
membership.  Experience under GATT and the WTO indicates that this has not 
always been the case in relation to RTAs. 
There is no generalized requirement for transparency or notification in 
either GATT or the WTO Agreement.  Instead, the WTO Agreement features a 
number of individual transparency obligations tailored to specific 
circumstances.  Thus, GATT Art. X:1 speaks of the obligation upon countries 
to publish trade-related legislation “promptly in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them” but also provides 
that the obligation does “not require any contracting party to disclose 
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be 
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial 
interests of particular enterprises, public or private.”27  The parallel provision 
in GATS is GATS Art. III and III bis.  A number of cases in GATT and WTO 
dispute settlement have also dealt with the extent to which countries as well as 
“individuals and bodies” have to disclose certain information.28 
In GATT Art. XXIV countries are obliged to fulfill the terms of GATT 
Art. XXIV:7(a) regarding disclosure of RTA arrangements as follows: 
7.(a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade 
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, 
shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available 
to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable 
them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they 
may deem appropriate.29 
This notification is supplemented by the 1996 Standard Format for 
Information on Regional Trade Agreements, which is designed “to facilitate 
and standardize the provision of initial information by parties to regional trade 
agreements.”30  The 1996 Standard Format is, however, purely voluntary31 and 
 
 27. GATT, supra note 5, art. X, ¶ 1. 
 28. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 104, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
(follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple 
Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS58/AB/R” under “Document symbol”); Appellate Body 
Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 185, WT/DS70/AB/R 
(Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under 
“Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS70/AB/R” 
under “Document symbol”). 
 29. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a). 
 30. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Chairman, Standard 
Format for Information on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/6 (Aug. 15, 1996), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
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therefore highlights a number of features in the WTO’s institutional culture 
that make it difficult to expect complete transparency in relation to RTAs. 
To begin with, the membership of the WTO is large and varied.  In July 
2008 it was composed of 153 members, a majority of which are developing 
countries.32  While all WTO members share many common obligations, there 
are many individualized obligations as well, and although progress has been 
made in recent years in standardizing WTO reporting requirements,33 it can be 
difficult to determine exactly how countries have implemented their 
concessions and commitments.  In addition, the staff of the WTO Secretariat 
remains relatively small34 and is required to maintain its neutrality and 
impartiality at all times.  This means that it can only provide limited assistance 
in the task of clarifying national concessions and commitments.  Instead, the 
work of doing so is often left to WTO Committees and the TPRM which 
operate by means of question-and-answer sessions that diplomats can easily 
evade or delay.  This structure betrays an institutional culture of passivity.  
Unlike other, more assertive international organizations like the EU,35 the 
WTO membership remains firmly in the driver’s seat.  Formally, there is very 
little that can be done to compel a country to do something in WTO law, 
including disclosure of the full terms of its participation in an RTA. 
What these observations translate into in practice is that GATT Art. 
XXIV:7(a) has been, and can be, interpreted loosely.  From the bare text it is 
not clear at what point “deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade 
area”36 foresees, and therefore countries have argued about whether it means at 
the outset of negotiations or just prior to their conclusion.  In addition, the term 
“shall promptly notify”37 is the subject of some ambiguity since some countries 
have waited considerable time before notifying either the text or any 
modifications of an RTA, meaning that effective review by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements is stymied.  A final concern with Art. XXIV:7(a) 
is that the bare requirement of prompt notification, when combined with the 
 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/6” under “Document 
symbol”). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). 
 33. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Trade Policy Reviews, Ensuring 
Transparency, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2008). 
 34. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, The Secretariat, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). 
 35. Reference is made here to various legal actions possible by the European Commission, 
the European Council, the European Parliament, and other bodies and individuals that have the 
effect of providing an internal system of checks and balances within the Union. 
 36. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
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voluntary nature of the 1996 Standard Format, says very little about exactly 
what should be notified, an omission that has led over time to incomplete or 
inconsistent notification of different agreements.  This practice deprives third 
parties of the ability to compare, and therefore to meaningfully challenge, what 
is being notified and may even contribute to the institutional culture of 
passivity referred to above. 
The Preamble to the TM recognizes that RTAs “have greatly increased in 
number and have become an important element in Members’ trade policies and 
developmental strategies” and that the Mechanism is to apply to GATT Art. 
XXIV, GATS Art. V and the 1979 Enabling Clause.38  In the case of 
notifications under GATT and GATS, implementation of the TM is left to the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, while notifications under 
paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause (involving RTAs between developing 
countries) are left to the Committee on Trade and Development.39 
An initial attribute of the TM is that it attempts to reinforce the notification 
obligation by moving the relevant notification dates forward.  Under the TM 
countries that are considering forming an RTA must now report their 
discussions to the WTO at the outset and keep it reasonably apprised during 
the course of negotiations.40  This is the “early announcement” component of 
the intensified obligation. 
Second, under the existing wording of Art. XXIV:7(a), countries entering 
into an RTA are required to “promptly notify” the WTO membership.41  What 
“promptly notify” means is, as mentioned, unclear.  The TM therefore requires 
that when the RTA is signed, information about conclusion of the final 
agreement is to be provided “as early as possible.”42  This is the “final 
announcement” component of the obligation. 
The third group of requirements relates to the provision and use of 
information.  The most significant change is with respect to the format in 
which the information is to be provided.43 Countries are to submit a standard 
set of information on their RTAs, which is collected by the Secretariat and 
made available in an electronic database.44  Over time this requirement should 
enhance comparability. 
What becomes clear is that the WTO Secretariat is given a more 
pronounced role in the collection and dissemination of this information.  Under 
 
 38. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10. 
 39. Id. ¶ 18. 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 41. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a) (emphasis added). 
 42. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. ¶ 7 (“[T]he parties shall make available to the WTO Secretariat data as specified in 
the Annex, if possible in an electronically exploitable format . . . .”). 
 44. Id. ¶ 21. 
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the TM, the Secretariat is now required to prepare an unbiased “factual 
presentation” about the proposed RTA with the information submitted by the 
parties,45 something that should provide a greater degree of neutrality and 
objectivity to WTO decision-making.  An Annex sets out required data on the 
subject of tariff concessions, Most Favored Nation duty rates, product-specific 
preferences and import statistics for the most recent three years preceding the 
notification.46  In respect of services, substantially similar data is required, a 
formulation necessitated by the fact that such information may be difficult to 
obtain in relation to intangibles.47 
The delicacy of the task entrusted to the WTO Secretariat is underlined in 
TM paragraph 9, which states that “the factual presentation . . . shall be 
primarily based on the information provided by the parties; if necessary, the 
WTO Secretariat may also use data available from other sources, taking into 
account the views of the parties in furtherance of factual accuracy.”48  It adds 
that “[i]n preparing the factual presentation, the WTO Secretariat shall refrain 
from any value judgment.”49  It also indicates that “[t]he WTO Secretariat’s 
factual presentation shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement 
procedures or to create new rights and obligations for Members.”50 
Fourth, the TM also clarifies a number of process-related obligations.  The 
TM attempts to avoid stymieing the consideration process by ensuring that “the 
timing of the data submission shall not exceed ten weeks—or twenty weeks in 
the case of RTAs involving only developing countries—after the date of the 
notification of the agreement.”51  Once notification has taken place and the 
factual presentation has been prepared, the TM mandates that the “RTA shall 
be considered by Members under the procedures established” in TM 
paragraphs 6–13.52  This consideration of the RTA by the WTO membership 
shall normally be concluded within a year following notification.53 
To further minimize any potential for delay, the meeting to consider the 
notified RTA is to be a “single” formal event,54 although how much attention 
should be paid to this is probably more debatable than real given that astute 
trade diplomats can potentially meet on an informal basis indefinitely. 
Fifth, coupled with the above are obligations that arise as to notification 
and reporting upon any changes to a previously notified RTA.  For instance, in 
 
 45. Id. arts. 7(b), 9. 
 46. Id. Annex, ¶ 2. 
 47. Id. Annex, ¶ 3. 
 48. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 9. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 10. 
 51. Id. ¶ 8. 
 52. Id. ¶ 5. 
 53. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 6. 
 54. Id. ¶ 11. 
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the case of “changes affecting the implementation of an RTA,”55 the change 
triggering notification is defined, inter alia, as “modifications to the 
preferential treatment . . . and to the RTA’s disciplines.”56  It is also 
noteworthy that in TM para. 15 concerning the end of the RTA’s 
implementation period, the parties are required to submit to the WTO a short 
written report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the RTA 
that was the subject of the original notification.57  This synopsis is to be 
distributed to the WTO membership, as are periodic updates.58 
The TM is neither comprehensive nor permanent.  TM Arts. 22–23 specify 
that the TM “shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs”59 and that the 
WTO membership will review and replace it in light of experience with a 
permanent mechanism adopted as part of the results of the Doha Round.60 
III.  EXPERIENCE UNDER THE TM 
Experience with the TM so far has been mixed.  Although the EC 
representative has described the first year of the Mechanism as “successful,” 
comments made both by the CRTA Chairman and other countries display a 
sense of unease at what is unfolding.61  It is clear that the TM places a certain 
burden on the WTO Secretariat to prepare factual presentations, but even more 
to the point, countries themselves are required to comment upon and question 
the Secretariat’s work and they have not always done so promptly. 
In summary, the 2007 Draft Report of the CRTA reveals that “prior to the 
adoption of the TM, the Committee had completed the factual examination of a 
total of 67 agreements, of which 46 [were] in the area of trade in goods and 21 
in trade in services.”62  The report also reveals that “the Secretariat distributed 
factual presentations of 13 RTAs, 11 of which were used as the basis for 
RTAs’ consideration in the CRTA during 2007 . . . . Seventeen RTAs are 
 
 55. Id. ¶ 14. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. ¶ 15. 
 58. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 17. 
 59. Id. ¶ 22. 
 60. Id. ¶ 23. 
 61. See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 29 
November 2007, WT/REG/M/48 (Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow 
“Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” 
hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/M/48” under “Document symbol”). 
 62. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Report (2007) of the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 6, WT/REG/18 (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 
Report to the General Council], available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/REG/18” under “Document symbol”). 
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scheduled for consideration . . . .; factual presentations of these RTAs are 
currently under preparation . . . .63 
There is a remaining backlog of sixty-four RTAs, comprised of thirty-six 
RTAs for which the factual presentation is still to be done and twenty-eight 
RTAs for which the factual presentation is on hold.”64 
The foregoing numbers may appear impressive, but in the final CRTA 
meeting of 2007 the Chairman noted that progress was slow: “only two (of a 
projected 11) were on the agenda of the meeting, with the rest having been 
rescheduled for 2008.”65  A number of difficulties have arisen with the TM’s 
process.  Some members continue to have problems respecting deadlines for 
data submission, and in some cases the format and quality of data received 
have not been as expected.66 
An illustration of some specific problems is apparent from minutes of the 
final CRTA meeting for 2007.  For the EFTA-Tunisia goods agreement, “the 
Secretariat had sent the draft factual presentation to the parties, although the 
data for Iceland and Tunisia was still incomplete.  The Secretariat was awaiting 
comments from Tunisia on the factual presentation that had been sent [to it] in 
July [2007].” 67  For the India-Singapore goods and services agreement, “the 
factual presentation had been drafted but the Secretariat had encountered a 
problem with India’s tariff and was awaiting clarification from the Indian 
authorities.”68  For the Japan-Mexico goods and services agreement “the 
Secretariat had received tariff data from both Parties, although there was some 
data missing in the tariff of Japan.  The Secretariat had received import data 
from Mexico but was still missing trade data from Japan.”69  For the Panama-
El Salvador goods and services agreement, “the Secretariat had received data 
that was not coherent . . . and was liaising with the Parties for clarification.”70  
For the Turkey-Tunisia goods agreement, “the Secretariat had received data 
from Turkey but was still awaiting the tariff phase down from Tunisia.”71 
 
 63. Id.  The WTO Secretariat is also required “to prepare a factual abstract for those RTAs 
for which the CRTA had concluded the factual examination by 31 December 2006 and for RTAs 
notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause.”  Id. ¶ 7.  As of mid-November 2007, “[e]ight 
factual abstracts [had] been prepared and placed on the WTO website; 30 were still awaiting 
comments from the parties, and the remaining 39 were under preparation.”  Id. 
 64. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 6. 
 65. Report to the General Council, supra note 62, ¶ 16. 
 66. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 8.  A number of questions 
associated with this issue have been canvassed in the CRTA, such as when discussion of an RTA 
can be considered completed and what ultimately completion means. See Note on the Meeting of 
14–15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 46.  The United States has suggested that the conclusion of the 
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These details reveal a number of specific problems with the TM’s 
operation.  First, there is the fact that the deadline for submission of replies to 
questions is nowhere spelled out.  Countries can delay the TM process simply 
by refusing to reply.72  Second, there is the potential for overlap in factual 
presentations on both goods and services, and the need to do duplicate 
presentations for each.73  The United States, in particular, has expressed 
concern in this regard given “the distinctiveness of the obligations and of the 
facts needed to be maintained.”74  Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is 
the use that might be made of the information being provided.75  For instance, 
Canada has cautioned “against thinking about additions that might depart from 
the more factual elements of a database to other information that might put 
[WTO] Members in a slightly uncomfortable position given the legal rules that 
applied to Members’ obligations on RTAs.”76  Fourth, it remains to be seen 
how the Mechanism is to deal with the measurement of RTAs between WTO 
and non-WTO members as well as disciplines in many new RTAs such as 
those involving investment, environmental protection and human rights that 
formally fall outside of the WTO Agreement’s scope of coverage.  A final 
issue concerns what “review” under the TM signifies—transparency or simply 
 
meeting should simply mean “that there was no need for further meeting and deadlines were 
provided for receipt of questions and replies.”  Id. 
 72. Id. ¶ 12. 
 73. Id. ¶ 14. 
 74. Id. ¶ 26. 
 75. Id. ¶ 25. 
 76. See discussion in Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 25.  In 
addition, there is the issue of backlog.  As of March 2007, there were “48 notified RTAs for 
which factual presentations had to be prepared.” WTO Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 March 2007, ¶ 19, WT/REG/M/45 (Apr. 30, 2007), 
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” 
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/M/45” under “Document 
symbol”).  Second, there are existing agreements from the period 1987–1994 when no reports 
were received and which were therefore not subject to any transparency provisions.  In that case, 
“the compromise [agreed to among countries] had been not to subject them to any more 
procedures in the CRTA, but to have a brief abstract prepared by the [WTO] Secretariat.”  Id. ¶ 
24.  The United States has indicated that it “look[s] forward to more transparency in these 
agreements and to holding consultations [on them]” because “some [are] of great importance such 
as NAFTA.”  Id.  The TM specifies that “RTAs for which a working party report has been 
adopted by the GATT Council and those notified under the Enabling Clause will be subject to 
subsequent notification requirements.”  Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 22(a).  The 
TM further specifies that “RTAs for which the CRTA has concluded the ‘factual examination’ 
prior to the [TM]” and those notified “under the Enabling Clause will be subject to” subsequent 
notification requirements.  Id. ¶ 22(b).  Finally, the TM specifies that “[a]ny RTA notified prior to 
the adoption of [the TM] and not referred to in subparagraphs (a) or (b) [of ¶ 22] will be subject 
to” full transparency obligations under the Mechanism.  Id. ¶ 22(c). 
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the fact that the RTA has been reviewed?  No clear answer has been given yet 
to this question.77 
In light of all of the above, it remains difficult to see how the TM will 
accelerate the WTO’s approval of RTAs and therefore provide the WTO 
system with any real benefit.  Most evidently, the TM does not require actual 
approval of notified agreements.  It simply promotes transparency in the 
notifications made. 
IV.  REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
Experience with the TM to date suggests a need to look elsewhere for 
inspiration as to how the Mechanism might be made more effective.  There is 
evidently the issue of compelling countries to cooperate with the TM’s 
requirements by reporting in a timely, transparent and accurate fashion.  If 
current behaviour continues, it may be necessary for the WTO Secretariat to 
become involved in a more assertive way by collecting “data available from 
other sources” as contemplated in TM.78  This could take the form of 
assembling material publicly disclosed by parties or by collecting information 
made available to other international organizations, third countries and NGOs.  
However, such an approach would be unlikely to resolve the deeper issue of 
RTA approval, which can only be done by countries. 
Attention also needs to be given to how the obligations in Art. XXIV 
might be creatively reinterpreted away from a largely quantitative analysis.  
Given that most of the information to be collected by the TM is of a 
quantitative nature and that metrification can cause problems in terms of 
estimation and “bottom-line” thinking, alternative measures of market 
openness will need to be developed.  The question remains how to do so. 
One possible way forward is the use of methods developed in regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA). An RIA is defined by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development as “an analytical and systematic approach to 
regulation encompassing a range of tools and techniques aimed at assessing the 
impacts of regulation.”79  The genesis of RIA lies in the realization that 
regulation can impose costs at the same time as it generates efficiencies.  A 
2007 OECD report notes that “[m]ost OECD countries rely on RIA to help 
ensure development of efficient and effective regulation and reduce the burden 
of regulation.”80  Further, “although an underlying consideration in a well-
developed and comprehensive RIA should be to identify regulations that 
 
 77. Id. ¶ 9. 
 78. Regulatory Reform and Market Openness, supra note 17, at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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minimize trade restrictiveness,”81 in practice, trade restrictiveness in new 
regulations is rarely measured explicitly, if identified at all.82 
Such consideration is timely, given renewed interest over the past eighteen 
months by the United States and EU in developing ways to include 
international trade impacts in regulatory reviews.  In November 2007, the 
United States and European Union made a pledge to work together in this 
respect in a joint paper released in the context of the Transatlantic Economic 
Dialogue (TED).83  Later, in February 2008, “U.S. and European business 
groups submitted detailed recommendations [on the paper] with the aim of 
revising and strengthening the ability of the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and the EU’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to rein in 
regulations by other agencies seen as damaging international trade.”84  Further, 
“[t]he proposals are controversial with consumer groups,” which regard them 
as “dangerous to public welfare, because they could be used . . . to ambush 
environmental and safety regulations with the argument that they could impede 
trade.”85 It appears that the OMB and the European Commission are 
“discussing possible regulatory harmonization and the inclusion of 
international trade impacts in regulatory reviews . . . [which] could result in a 
joint communiqué on the matter in May [2008] . . . .”86 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Business, Consumer Groups Square Off On EU-U.S. Harmonization, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, Feb. 29, 2008 at 12 [hereinafter Business, Consumer Groups Square Off]. 
 83. Id. 
  In its comments, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce went beyond the paper’s 
recommendation and proposed that OMB amend its Circular A-4, which governs 
regulatory impact assessments to include the impact of a regulation on services trade.  
This would be an expansion because the circular now only covers trade in goods. 
  In addition, the Chamber wants OMB to expand the definition of trade impacts to 
include more than the impact on the flow of imports and exports. Sean Heather, a 
Chamber expert, said investment impacts should also be measured on companies that set 
up subsidiaries in either the EU or U.S., but do not necessarily export.  According to the 
Chamber, cost-benefit analyses should be released for public comment. 
  The EU, the Chamber recommends, should do more to make its regulatory process 
transparent, enforce rules that require six-week comment periods, and give the IAB the 
authority to stop bad regulations. 
Id. at 12–13. 
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Turkey—Restrictions On Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, supra note 9, ¶ 
9.148. 
The ordinary meaning of the term “substantially” in the context of subparagraph 8(a) 
appears to provide for both qualitative and quantitative components.  The expression 
“substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of 
the Members of the [customs] union” would appear to encompass both quantitative and 
qualitative elements, the quantitative aspect more emphasized in relation to duties. 
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The possibility of focusing on trade impacts appears to run counter to 
current trends in RIA conduct.  Contemporary RIA features both “quantitative 
and qualitative components,” as seen in Turkey—Textiles.  Indeed, the 
November 2007 U.S./EU paper “propose[s] three steps for measuring 
international trade impacts, only one of which is presumptively quantitative: 
demonstrating the need for a regulation that might impede trade, measuring the 
degree that foreign and domestic businesses are affected, and looking at 
international best practices for handling the issue subject to regulation.”87 
A 2006 analysis of current trends in RIA reveals that there are five main 
analytical methods used by top RIA performing countries, including:  
a range of partial analyses such as [Small and Medium Enterprise (SME)] 
tests, administrative burden estimates, business impact tests and other analyses 
of effects on specified groups and stemming from certain kinds of regulatory 
costs; risk assessment, aimed at characterizing the probability of outcomes a 
result of specified inputs; various forms of sensitivity or uncertainty analysis 
that project the likelihood of a range of possible outcomes due to estimation 
errors.  Uncertainty analysis is used to provide policymakers with a more 
accurate understanding of the likelihood of impacts.88 
The same report notes that “[t]he economics thrust of RIA has always 
favoured benefit-cost analysis (BCA) as the most inclusive and socially 
responsible method of public decision-making.”89  The reason for this is that 
economics offers the “important advantage of comparing costs and benefits 
occurring at different points in time.”90  Further, “BCA is the method long used 
by governments [to assess] investment projects such as roads and dams and 
[was] adapted to more general regulatory policy issues in the 1970s.”91  It is 
also the preferred method for regulatory assessment used by the United States 
since 1981 and by Canada since 1992.92 
Nevertheless, traditional concern about the “over-monetization of 
impacts”93 means that mainstream BCA analysis is of a “soft form . . . in which 
 
Id. This language was quoted with approval in a subsequent Appellate Body Report. See 
Appellate Body Report,  Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 49, 
WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” 
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter 
“WT/DS34/AB/R” under “Document symbol”). 
 87. Business, Consumer Groups Square Off, supra note 82, at 12. 
 88. Scott Jacobs, JACOBS AND ASSOC., Current Trends in Regulatory Impact Analysis: The 
Challenges of Mainstreaming RIA into Policy-making 34 (2006), available at 
http://www.regulatoryreform.com/pdfs/Current%20Trends%20and%20Processes%20in%20RIA 
%20-%20May%20 2006%20Jacobs%20and%20Associates.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Jacobs, supra note 88, at 34. 
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quantitative and qualitative metrics are combined and presented 
systematically.”94  Scott Jacobs states that “[t]here is no country in which 
modern BCA insists on the monetization of all benefits and costs . . . .”95  
Instead, he notes that “critics of BCA in RIA usually ignore this fact in favour 
of an exaggerated and theoretical version of BCA that lends itself to 
caricature.”96 
BCA is the method best adapted to protecting a broad range of interests.  
One of the key advantages of benefit-cost frameworks is that they encompass 
the broadest range of impacts across the social-economic-environmental 
spectrum.  Hence, they are line with nearly universal political demands that 
RIA methods address a wider range of public interests.  In response, RIA 
methods are embracing more and more impacts, including operational, capital, 
dynamic costs and all major benefits using methods based on social welfare 
theory.97 
At the same time, soft BCA has been questioned, if not challenged, in 
recent years by various types of partial analyses that consist of fragmenting 
RIA among various kinds of subjects to look at different impacts.98  As Jacobs 
observes, “the increase in partial analysis is not . . . any reasoned 
dissatisfaction with [soft BCA] . . . ,” but rather the fact that “RIA is entering 
the mainstream of policy and is coming under pressure from the many groups 
who now understand that they have a stake in RIA.”99  Consequently, soft 
BCA is evolving from “a technocratic tool of general interest into a political 
and policy tool with constituency group impacts.”100  The outcome is a 
politicization of the RIA process.  Different assessments fragment “into 
smaller, competing analyses.”101  Jacobs concludes: 
  unfortunately, in more and more countries, use of partial analyses, driven 
by competitiveness issues and in part by political intent to serve vocal 
constituencies, has actually resulted in fragmentation into competing policy 
agendas, because the larger integrated framework is not clearly defined or 
emphasized.102 
How might experience with RIA be assimilated into the WTO’s TM?  Two 
recent harmonization directives introduced by the Government of Canada 
provide some ideas for an answer.  In 2007, the federal government issued the 
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Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (CDSR),103 which was followed 
by the Treasury Board’s release of Guidelines on International Regulatory 
Obligations and Cooperation (“the Guidelines”).104  Both are aimed at 
“managers, functional specialists and regulatory staff” and are supposed to 
clarify expectations of the Treasury Board Secretariat when it exercises its 
“challenge” function—that is, the ability to question, and if necessary 
postpone, the introduction of new regulations.105  It is not hard to analogize this 
function to what is supposed to happen under the TM in its assessment of 
notified RTAs. 
The Guidelines reveal that the overall goal is to “encourage greater 
regulatory compatibility [with international regulations] when it can provide 
the greatest overall benefits to Canadians.”106  In doing so, the Guidelines state 
that Canadian federal “departments and agencies must undertake to meet 
international regulatory obligations and cooperation (IROC) requirements . . . 
in ways that maintain public confidence in the Canadian regulatory system.”107 
The goal of regulatory compatibility “with key international counterparts” 
is to allow the government of Canada to “reach policy goals more readily . . . 
with lower costs to the government and to Canadians.”108  It also makes 
possible “compliance with applicable international treaty law and its 
implementation in Canada . . .” through “access to regulatory resources of 
international bodies and other countries . . .” and “allow[s] Canada to 
contribute its expertise and promote best regulatory practices internationally, 
thus influencing standards elsewhere.”109  For these reasons, the CDSR and the 
Guidelines encourage Canadian federal government departments and agencies 
to: 
take international regulatory cooperation (IRC) into account throughout the entire life 
cycle of regulati[on], [including] development, implementation, evaluation, and review; 
think strategically about how IRC can assist in achieving regulatory outcomes; 
establish regulatory compatibility as a goal for regulators to achieve through the design 
of regulations and through ongoing regulatory cooperation activities with key 
international counterparts; actively consider IRC in the ongoing management of 
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regulatory programs . . . . and; regularly assess the effectiveness of their IRC 
activities . . . .”110 
Most importantly, the Guidelines create a presumption in favour of 
international regulation, which is phrased in the following terms: “[while] it is 
recognized that there are cases where the pursuit of sound policy objectives 
may require unique Canadian standards or regulations . . . a clear rationale for 
this unique approach must be evident in the regulatory analysis.”111 
At the same time, nothing in either the CDSR or the Guidelines requires 
Canadian departments and agencies to automatically regulate according to 
international regulations.112  Instead, the Guidelines only speak of cooperation 
and set out considerations in choosing partners for regulatory activity.113  
These are Canada’s existing partners in North America (the United States, 
Mexico) and the EU.114  The rest of the world receives little reference.  
Emerging and expanding economies are identified as the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and here regulatory cooperation is phrased in 
defensive terms: it “should be geared to ensuring that Canadians receive 
adequate protections on the products and services imported from these 
countries and that Canadian products, services, and investors have ready access 
to these emerging markets.”115  The Guidelines also recognize the dual nature 
of international regulation, informing Canadian regulatory practice and 
outcomes while also enhancing Canada’s “leadership role” in international 
regulatory efforts.116 
It seems clear from the Guidelines that compatibility with international 
regulations in Canada is something that the Canadian government now 
prioritizes, yet the absence of an explicit “trade effects” test is notable.  In this 
respect, the CDSR and Guidelines present an alternative vision to that of the 
TED.  The Guidelines make clear that achieving regulatory harmonization is 
what is important.  There is a belief in the validity of existing international 
regulations and a subsisting desire to align with them.  Canadian variants are to 
be avoided unless necessary. 
The TM might usefully employ a similar methodology in its assessment of 
RTAs.  For example, an RTA might be assessed to the extent that it departs 
from internationally accepted regulations or, where some numeric assessment 
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is required, from an average calculated among the WTO membership.  This 
kind of measurement is already employed in WTO trade negotiations on such 
subjects as tariffs and negotiating coefficients.117  A focus on more than simply 
numbers would have the added benefit of drawing attention away from 
numerical targets and of reaffirming that much of the benefit that arises from 
international trade is, in fact, incalculable. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The TM is the latest phase in efforts to bring transparency and consistency 
to the treatment of RTAs in WTO law.  Uniformity is to be welcomed, but 
there are many obstacles to its successful operation, not the least of which is 
the willingness of countries to provide the necessary information.  It is too 
soon to tell if the difficulties it has experienced to date are simply teething 
problems or something more serious. 
In at least one respect, the accrual of information in the TM database and 
its comparability should help to move the question of developing disciplines 
for RTAs forward by emphasizing inconsistencies between RTAs.  The 
comparison will furnish some idea of what the degree of inconsistency should 
be.  At the same time, as noted, it would be unwise to measure those 
differences in a purely quantitative way.  Strictly quantitative analysis is likely 
to provoke invidious comparisons and poison the negotiating atmosphere.  
Techniques developed in RIA that involve regulatory harmonization and the 
justification of deviating measures may ultimately be of greater assistance in 
this regard. 
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